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NOTE
WHO OWNS THE COW WHEN WE GIVE AWAY THE




THE ADVENT OF ONLINE COPYING
A copyright is a statutory grant of protection for "original
works of authorship."' A work of authorship qualifies for copyright if
it meets the low threshold for originality, both by being an independent
creation, and having some modicum of originality.2 The copyright
protection attaches to a work of authorship the moment that the work
is fixed in "any tangible medium of expression, now known or later
developed," that is sufficiently stable to permit the work to be
"perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or
with the aid of a machine or device."' 3 By holding the copyright of a
work, the owner holds a bundle of exclusive rights that he may be
assign, subdivide, or in the case of infringement, defend.4 The first
portion of this paper examines the nature of the protections created for
works of authorship under U.S. copyright law and the ramifications of
t In writing this paper, the author benefited from the guidance and insight of Professor
Paul Janicke and Professor Raymond T. Nimmer at the University of Houston Law Center.
Additionally, the author gathered ideas from panelists and lecturers at the 2004 South by
Southwest Interactive Conference, including Pete Kennedy from Graves, Dougherty, Hearon,
& Moody, Wendy Seltzer from the Electronic Frontier Foundation, and Neeru Paharia from the
Creative Commons.
17 U.S.C. § 102 (2002).
2 § 102(a). See also ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW
AGE 328 (3d ed. 2001) ("Courts have rarely found literary or artistic works to fall below the de
minimis originality threshold of copyright law"). But see Toro Co. v. R & R Prods. Co., 787
F.2d 1208, 1213 (8th Cir. 1986) (the court recognized the low threshold for the originality
standard, but nevertheless denied copyright protection for an equipment numbering system
because it failed to meet the originality standard).
3 § 102(a). See also United States v. Washington Mint, LLC, 115 F. Supp. 2d 1089,
1098-99 (D. Minn. 2000) (the court held that a coin sculptor's copyright protection in a plastic
mold arose upon creation of the work and fixation of the work in a tangible medium of
expression, but that the plaintiff subsequently assigned her copyright in the work to the
government).
4 17 U.S.C. §§ 103, 106, 501 (2002); H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 61(1976), reprinted in
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5674. ("These exclusive rights, which comprise the so-called
'bundle of rights' that is a copyright, are cumulative and may overlap in some cases. Each of
the five enumerated rights may be subdivided indefinitely and, as discussed below in connec-
tion with section 201, each subdivision of an exclusive right may be owned and enforced
separately.").
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strict liability policies on those protections, focusing on the infringe-
ment liability issues that have arisen in recent years in relation to the
Internet. The second portion of this paper examines the fair use defense
and the relationship between the fair use defense and licensing. Finally,
the third portion of the paper examines the fair use defense as applied
to copying web-posted materials and explores the possibilities for
infringement in several different areas of Internet use.
The foundation of federal copyright law is the Copyright Act,
which outlines the requirements for subject matter that is eligible for
protection and limits the scope of protection to expression. 5 Every
work of authorship, regardless of the category of expression, must also
meet the requirement of fixation for copyright protection. The work
must be "'fixed' in a tangible medium of expression," so that it is
"sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, repro-
duced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory
duration."'6 Furthermore, the work must not consist of "any idea,
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or
discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained,
illustrated, or embodied," since copyright law only protects categories
of expression. 7 Section 102 enumerates categories of ex-
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2002).
6 Id.
7 Specifically, the Copyright Act extends protection to works of authorship including "the
following categories: (1) literary works; (2) musical works, including any accompanying
words; (3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music; (4) pantomimes and choreo-
graphic works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and other
audiovisual works; (7) sound recordings; and (8) architectural works." § 102(a). Whereas §
102(a) defines the scope of copyrightable subject matter by inclusion, § 102(b) defines the
scope by exclusion in order to avoid giving the copyright holder an overly broad monopoly
over all expression in a particular market. § 102(b). See, e.g., Broderbund Software Inc. v.
Unison World Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1127, 1132 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (citing the analogy of giving a
manufacturer a monopoly on the jewel-encrusted bee pin market by allowing the manufacturer
to copyright a jewel-encrusted bee pin in Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446
F.2d 738, 741-42 (9th Cir. 197 1)). The reasoning behind § 102(b) forms the foundation of the
merger doctrine originally set forth by Professor Denicola and adopted by the court in Brandir
Int'l, Inc. v. Cascade Pacific Lumber Co.. Robert C. Denicola, Applied Art and Industrial
Design: A Suggested Approach to Copyright in Useful Articles, 67 MINN. L. REV. 707, 709-17
(1983); Brandir Int'l, Inc. v. Cascade Pacific Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142 (2d Cir. 1987). Under
the merger doctrine, a work is not copyrightable subject matter "if design elements reflect a
merger of aesthetic and functional considerations" because "the artistic aspects of a work
cannot be said to be conceptually separable from the utilitarian elements." Brandir, 834 F.2d
at 1145. A work that includes both functional and aesthetic elements may only be copyrighted
if it embodies conceptual separability-that is, the "design elements can be identified as
reflecting the designer's artistic judgment." Id. In Brandir, the court denied copyright protec-
tion to the plaintiffs wire bike rack because the minimalist, modem design of a bicycle
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pression that are eligible for copyright, such as literary works, audio-
visual works, musical works and pictorial works, but judicial interpre-
tation of the statute has "extended the scope of the congressional power
with respect to intellectual property protection" to encompass "all
forms of media not in existence at the time of early congressional
enactments." 8 The list ofprotectible categories of expression in Section
102 is non-exclusive, and the categories are broad.9 Recent develop-
ments in Internet technology have spurred an expansion of the Section
103 categories to include new media, such as software, digital images
and layouts.' 0 But these new applications of copyright law are often
"elusive and perplexing," since "[t]he world wide web [sic] has pro-
gressed far faster than the law and, as a result, courts are struggling to
catch up." "1
Like the restrictions on the subject matter of copyright, the
scope of protection created by a copyright is also limited. Section 106
of the Copyright Act gives copyright owners exclusive control over the
reproduction, distribution, display and performance of the copyrighted
work, as well as control over the preparation of derivative works.' 2
The creation of a work vests the entire "bundle" of copyrights in the
rack and the shape of the rack reflected both utilitarian and aesthetic factors and avoiding the
kind of non-expressive copyright that Congress intended to exclude in § 102(b). Id.; § 102(b).
8 William Tucker Griffith, Beyond the Perfect Score: Protecting Routine-Oriented
Athletic Performance With Copyright Law, 30 CoNN. L. REV. 675, 691-92 (1998)
("Subsequent judicial interpretations of the language of the Copyright Clause have greatly
extended the scope of the congressional power with respect to intellectual property protection
... A fair and liberal interpretation of the language of the Copyright Clause accounts for all
forms of media not in existence at the time of early congressional enactments in support of the
Constitution. Quite clearly, the Framers could not have imagined the advanced concepts which
eventually created modem replication devices such as the audio or video recorder, the compu-
ter, fax machine, compact disc, or laser disc.")
9 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2002) (stating that "[w]orks of authorship include the following
categories ... ").
10 See, e.g., MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 517-18 (9th Cir. 1993)
(discussing copyrighted software used in intermediate copying); Playboy Enter. v. Webbworld,
Inc., 991 F. Supp. 543, 550 (N.D. Tex. 1997) (discussing copyrighted digital pornographic
images); Broderbund Software Inc., 648 F. Supp. at 1127 (upholding the copyright of a
graphical layout in software); Costar Group, Inc. v. Loopnet, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 2d 688 (D. Md.
2001) (discussing the copyrighted digital images of real estate).
I I Loopnet, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 2d at 693.
12 17 U.S.C. §§ 103, 106 (2002). The copyright of a derivative work is limited to "the
material contributed by the author of such work, as distinguished from the preexisting material
employed in the work." It neither implies "any exclusive right in the preexisting material" nor
affects nor enlarges "the scope, duration, ownership, or subsistence of, any copyright protec-
tion in the preexisting material." Id. at § 103(b).
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creator of a copyrighted work, unless the creator decides to transfer any
of the rights.' 3 This "bundle" of exclusive rights can be separated or
subdivided into separate, smaller rights, and "each subdivision of an
exclusive right may be owned and enforced separately."' 14 A single
website, for example, "may incorporate many of these [rights] at the
same time by using pictures and music and real-time video."' 5 But the
exclusive rights enumerated in Section 106 are neither permanent in
duration nor unlimited in scope, since they are also subject to restric-
tions in Sections 107 through 122.16 The restrictions in Sections
107-122 ensure that the copyright owner receives merely a "limited
monopoly" over the work of authorship.' 7 The limited monopoly
reflects the importance, recognized by Congress, of balancing the
author's economic interest in the work with society's interest in the
13 H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 61 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5674. See
also Ned T. Himmelrich & Jennifer L. Dean, Keeping Online Activity in Line: Internet
Trademark and Copyright Law, 33 MD. B.J. 39, 41 (2000) ("Creators of copyrighted works
retain exclusive rights in their works unless they transfer those rights in writing.").
14 H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 61.
15 Himmelrich & Dean, supra note 14, at 41. See generally, Marshall Brain, How Web
Pages Work, at http://computer.howstuffworks.com/web-pagel.htm (last visited Feb 6, 2005)
(defining a web page and explaining how web page code interacts with a browser to produce
the display on the screen) ("A Web page [sic] is a simple text file that contains not only text,
but also a set of HTML tags that describe how the text should be formatted when a browser
displays it on the screen. The tags are simple instructions that tell the Web browser how the
page should look when it is displayed. The tags tell the browser to do things like change the
font size or color, or arrange things in columns. The Web browser interprets these tags to
decide how to format the text onto the screen.").
16 Congress did not intend for copyright protection to be either infinite or all-encompass-
ing. For works created on or after January 1, 1978, copyright is limited to duration of 70 years
after the author's death, for the term of 70 years after the last surviving author's death, or in an
anonymous work, for a term of either 95 or 120 years from the year of first publication,
whichever comes first. See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a)-(c) (2002). Moreover, copyright is not a blanket
grant of protection for authors, but rather a grant of protection that balances "between the
interests of authors and inventors in the control and exploitation of their writings and discover-
ies on the one hand, and society's competing interest in the free flow of ideas, information, and
commerce on the other hand." Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
429 (1984).
17 Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. at 429 ("[T]his task involves a difficult balance
between the interests of authors ... in the control and exploitation of their writings ... on the one
hand, and society's competing interest in the free flow of ideas, information, and commerce on
the other hand."). For example, the court in Sony Computer Entm 't, Inc. v. Connectix Corp.
held that the interest in protecting the market from a monopoly on the video game market
outweighed the interest in protecting defendant video game manufacturer from loss of profits.
Sony Computer Entm't, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 599-600 (9th Cir. 2000), cert.
denied, 531 U.S. 871 (2000). Accordingly, the court ruled that the defendant's use of reverse
engineering to build a video game emulator fell within the fair use exception. Id.
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expression embodied in that work. 18 Copyright is "intended to moti-
vate creative activity" by providing the putative author with "a limited
period of exclusive control," which does eventually expire. 19 Upon
expiration of the copyright, the author's private interest yields to the
public interest in "total access to the products of their genius," since
after all the "ultimate aim [of the Copyright Act] [is] to stimulate
artistic creativity for the general public good."20
Even though there are limitations on the duration and scope of
the exclusive rights, federal copyright protection generally operates
under a strict liability scheme. 2' Liability may attach to an infringing
party, even if the infringing party lacks intent to infringe or knowledge
of infringement. 22 Under Section 501 of the Copyright Act, an action
for direct infringement consists of "proof of ownership" and the
"violation of any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner as
provided by Sections 106 through 122 or of the author as provided in
18 Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. at 429.
19 Sega Enter. v. Accolade, Inc., 785 F. Supp. 1392, 1400 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (quoting West
Publ'g Co. v. Mead Data Cent., Inc., 616 F. Supp. 1571, 1582 (D. Minn 1985).
2' Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d at 603 (citing Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. at 432
(quoting Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151 (1975))).
21 The idea of comparing copyright infringement with the tort of strict liability has
surfaced in a number of court opinions. See Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H. L. Green Co., 316
F.2d 304, 308 (2d Cir. 1963) ("While there have been some complaints concerning the
harshness of the principle of strict liability in copyright law,...courts have consistently refused
to honor the defense of absence of knowledge or intention."). See also Educ. Testing Serv. v.
Simon, 95 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1087 (C.D. Cal. 1999) ("There is no need to prove anything about
a defendant's mental state to establish copyright infringement; it is a strict liability tort."). The
resemblance between copyright infringement and strict liability becomes problematic in the
digital medium, where users may unknowingly incur liability simply by browsing the Internet.
See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1167 (C.D. Cal. 2002)
(citing Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs. Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361
(N.D. Cal. 1995) (the court discussed the "challenge to copyright's strict liability scheme"
posed by computer technology, in particular because "almost any business that utilizes compu-
ter hardware to create access to the Internet or to store content may find its hardware creating
or displaying infringing material as a result of decisions by third-parties (the system's users)
without the business doing any truly volitional actions.").
22 Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H. L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 308 (2d Cir. 1963); Butcf
Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Serv. Inc., 907 F. Supp. 136.1, 1370
(N.D. Cal. 1995) (in a case that preceded the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of October
1998 and its infringement liability exemption for ISPs, the court acknowledged that "copyright
is a strict liability statute," but exempted the defendant ISP from liability for Christian Science
documents posted on an Internet user using the ISP's network. The court reasoned that "there
should still be some element of volition or causation which is lacking where a defendant's
system is merely used to create a copy by a third party."). Cf Marobie-Fl, Inc. v. Nat'l Ass'n
of Fire Equip. Distrib., 983 F. Supp. 1167, 1176-79 (N.D. I11 1997) (exempting the ISP from
liability when a web site owner posted copyrighted electronic clip art to a web site hosted by
the ISP).
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Section 106A(a), or who imports copies or phonorecords into the
United States in violation of section 602."23 The ownership require-
ment may be satisfied if the plaintiff can establish either "legal or
beneficial owner[ship] of an exclusive right under a copyright...." or
ownership of a proprietary right through the chain of title.2 4 The
second element of an infringement action is the violation of any of the
exclusive rights enumerated in Section 106 of the Copyright Act,
including the right to reproduce the copyrighted work, to prepare
derivative works, to distribute copies of the work, to perform the work
publicly, to display the work publicly, or to perform the work by means
of digital audio transmission.25 An action for copyright infringement
may be filed against not only an infringing party, but also against "one
who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or
materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another...." 26 The
standard for infringement liability, established under section 106 of the
Copyright Act, may be broadened to include the defendant who
"engages in personal conduct that encourages or assists the
infringement."27
The World Wide Web, one portion of the Internet, consists of
"a network of interconnected computers linked by communications
lines that allow persons with the appropriate software to access other
computers with their local computer through the use of a modem. 28
A web page is "a collection of electronic documents which may include
text, graphics, sound, or video," where a user may place or receive
information.29 Many copyright owners distribute free content, ranging
from downloads to e-mail services to chat rooms, through the World
Wide Web in an attempt to attract users to their sites and to exploit
23 Section 501 establishes the standard for infringement liability. 17 U.S.C. § 501 (2000).
See Costar Group Inc. v. Loopnet, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 2d 688, 694 (D. Md. 2001) (citing A &
M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1013 (9th Cir. 2001)) ("A prima facie case of
direct infringement consists of proof of ownership of the allegedly infringed material and
violation of at least one of the exclusive rights granted to copyright holders under 17 U.S.C. §
106.").
24 § 501; Marobie-Fl, Inc., 983 F. Supp. at 1173 (N.D. Ill 1997) (citing Motta v. Samuel
Weiser, Inc., 768 F.2d 481, 484 (1st Cir. 1985)).
25 17 U.S.C. § 106(a) (2000).
26 Costar Group Inc., 164 F. Supp. 2d at 696 (citing Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia
Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1972). See also_Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry
Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1996).
27 Costar Group Inc., 164 F. Supp. 2d at 696 (citing Matthew Bender & Co. v. West
Publ'g Co., F.3d 693, 706 (2d Cir. 1998)).
28 Marobie-F1, Inc., 983 F. Supp. at 1171.
29 Id.
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the intellectual property in a cost-effective, global medium. Through
mechanisms such as bulletin boards, chat rooms, e-mail and, in partic-
ular, web pages, any Internet user can "[r]eadily copy, transmit, dis-
play, and perform other parties' work on a worldwide basis an in an
unlimited manner...." 30 However, the kind of "global access" to
"downloadable materials" provided by the Internet enables anyone
with a computer and Internet access to violate copyright with ease, in
particular to violate the copyright owner's exclusive right to reproduce
the work. 3' The advent of the Internet has expanded the realm of
possibilities for copyright infringement, particularly in the area of
unauthorized reproduction or copying. 32 The early growth of the Inter-
net and global Internet use in the 1990s was associated with a mild but
pervasive theme of anarchy. 33 The Internet was a virtual territory that
could be explored by anyone in the world, regardless of national
borders.34 During the so-called Information Age, the Internet was
viewed as "a post-national" environment where the legitimacy of the
state was weakened, because the rate of technological change made it
"almost impossible for regulators to keep up with a technology that
reinvents itself every few months. ' 35 However, the widespread notion
that developed as a result of these changes, that "online material is free
for the taking," was largely a fallacy. 36 Copyright still attaches to the
work, provided that the content is copyrightable and copyright owners
still hold the same exclusive rights to the work, regardless of
"[w]hether their copyrighted works are embodied in a three-dimen-
sional object you can hold or appear on-line [sic]."
37
30 Jay Kogan, Protecting & Policing Rights Online & Reacting to Online Infringement,
in PRACTISING LAW INST., NO. G-686, REPRESENTING THE NEW MEDIA COM-
PANY 399, 401 (2002) (describing how the challenges posed by the Internet to intellectual
property owners who wish to defend their rights).
31 Id
32 Rosemarie F. Jones, Wet Footprints? Digital Watermarks: A Trail to the Copyright
Infringer on the Internet, 26 PEPP. L. REv. 559, 559-60 (1998-99) ("[U]nlike tangible objects,
copyright infringement is possible with a few mouse clicks ... within a fraction of the original
time with a potential distribution to millions of people all over the world. This is the Internet-
the haven of information and the garden of civil and criminal liability.").
33 Michael D. Birnhack & Niva Elkin-Koren, The Invisible Handshake: The Reemergence




36 Himmelrich & Dean, supra note 14, at 41,
37 Id. at 41-42 (recognizing that the copyright holder's exclusive rights remain intact when
the work is posted to the Internet, but suggested an implied license from the author
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Infringement occurs both in the commercial setting, where the
infringing party intends to capitalize on the copyright owner's exclu-
sive right, as well as in the non-commercial setting, where the infring-
ing party may either unintentionally or willfully infringe the
copyright.38 Online acts of copying may occur "without much, if any
deliberation," for example, when a non-commercial user browses the
World Wide Web and unwittingly creates copies of web site files on
their computers or even when the Internet service provider (ISP) stores
the files on a remote server to reduce download time for the user.39
Non-commercial users may also willfully infringe copyright under the
philosophy that "information wants to be free."'40 But any online activ-
ity may implicate a number of exclusive rights in a number ofjurisdic-
tions, and the rights may each be owned by different entities. 4' For
example, a web page may permit a user to download a work from the
web site, implicating the copyright, but the same page may also display
a work or stream the performance of a work, implicating a display right
or a performance right.42 The right of reproduction protects a copyright
owner from infringement even if the act of infringement does not
violate other exclusive rights under Section 106, such as the distribu-
tion or publication of content - mere copying is sufficient to trigger
liability.43 In the commercial arena, copyright holders frequently use
programming techniques to regulate the use of their online materials by
allowing the source code itself to dictate "what actions are feasible and
what options become available." 44 In response
might exist).
31 See Bruce P. Keller & Jeffrey P. Cunard, What Rights are Implicated by Activities in
the Online World?, COPYRIGHT LAW, § 14:2 (Practising Law Institute, 2d ed., 2002).
39 Id. at § 14-6. See also Brain, supra note 16 (a web browser seeks out a web page from
a web server on the Internet, requests the page, and transforms the html code on the page into
a visual display).
40 Keller & Cunard, supra note 38, § 14:2 (citing John Perry Barlow, The Framework for
Economy of Ideas: Rethinking Patents and Copyrights in the Digital Age, WIRED, Mar. 1994,
at 83, 89).
41 Id. § 14:4.
42 Id. (listing online practices that may trigger liability by violating one or more of the
copyright owner's exclusive rights).
41 Sega Enter. v. Accolade, Inc., 785 F. Supp. 1392, 97 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (noting that
regardless of whether a defendant publishes or distributes a work, the defendant may still
violate the right of reproduction "even if the creator considers those steps mere interim copies
toward some final goal"). Cf discussion infra note 137.
44 Birnhack & Elkin-Korean, supra note 34, at 21. "A source code is a computer program
written in any of several programming languages employed by computer programmers."
Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982) (citing the Final Report
of the National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works, U.S. DEPT. OF
COMMERCE, PB-282141, at 21 n.109 (July 31, 1978)).
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to the threat of piracy, web site operators have developed digital rights
management tools, such as encrypted audio files or streaming media
content, to protect online content. 45 Web site operators have also
resorted to contractual measures, such as licensing, to resolve the issue
of piracy.46 But when such technological and contractual measures fail,
whether because of error or user circumvention, the owners of copy-
righted online content have exercised their intellectual property rights
in response to unauthorized copying.
47
The Copyright Act defines copies as "material objects, other
than phonorecords, in which a work is fixed by any method now known
or later developed, and from which the work can be perceived, repro-
duced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a
machine or device," including "the material object, other than a phon-
orecord, in which the work is first fixed. '48 Because it is difficult to
obtain direct evidence of copying, a copyright holder may, in the
absence of direct evidence of copying, establish copying by showing
45 Digital rights management tools are the private sector's solution to the issue of
infringement online. Bradford L. Smith, The Third Industrial Revolution: Policymakingfor the
Internet. 3 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 84 (2002). These tools make it more difficult for
would-be pirates to violate copyrights, and furthermore provide the copyright holder with the
opportunity to sell separate individual works from compilations and sell them to users. Id.
Examples of digital rights management tools include steganography or digital watermarking,
and encryption. Jones, supra note 33, at 560-72. Steganography consists of "encoding digitized
information with attributes that cannot be disassociated from the file that contains the informa-
tion." Id. at 568. Encryption scrambles data "using mathematical principles that can be
followed in reverse to 'unscramble' the data." Id. at 571. Both approaches to digital rights
management alter the medium in which the data is fixed, in order to decrease the likelihood of
copyright infringement, but neither approach is fail-safe. Id. at 569, 572. Steganography may
decrease the quality of a particular file, so that a user no longer wants a copy of it. Id at 569.
Encryption may permit unlimited infringement once the code is broken and distributed. Id at
572.
46 Creative Commons, for example, is a nonprofit corporation that "promotes the creative
re-use of intellectual works" by proposing "user-friendly, alternative licensing terms to au-
thors." Press Releases (Dec. 3, 2003), at http://creativecommons.org/press-releases. Creative
Commons explains and provides sample licenses for web site owners to download and post on
their web pages. Id. A user can "mix and match" licensing options, which range from
"attribution" ("[y] ou let others copy, distribute, display, and perform your copyrighted
work-and derivative works based upon it- but only if they give you credit) to "no derivative
works" ("[y]ou let others copy, distribute, display, and perform only verbatim copies of your
work, not derivative works based upon it."). Licenses Explained (Feb. 17, 2004), at http://
creativecommons.org/learn/licenses.
47 See, e.g., Los Angeles Times v. Free Republic, No. CV 98-7840 MMM, 2000 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 5669, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d 1453 (C.D. Cal. March 31, 2000) (holding in favor of
infringement where defendant website operator posted full-length articles on its news discus-
sion website, in spite of the fact that plaintiff newspaper publisher maintained password-
protected archives).
48 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2005).
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that the defendant had access to the original work and that the copy
bears a substantial similarity to the original work.49 Liability only
attaches to a copy where the copy is substantially similar to both the
ideas and expression in the original work to meet the definition of a
copy for the purposes of establishing infringement.50 The test for
substantial similarity, first established by the court in Arnstein v.
Porter, consists of an extrinsic and an intrinsic analysis of the work.
The extrinsic portion of the test analyzes and dissects specific criteria,
such as the material used to create the work, the subject matter, and the
setting for the subject, whereas the intrinsic portion of the test focuses
on the expression and whether an ordinary, reasonable person would
find works to be substantially similar.51 Under either analysis, the work
in question must be "so strikingly similar" to the original work so "as
to preclude the possibility of independent creation," in order to support
a finding of copying, where there is no evidence of access. 52 Often,
however, online copies are either identical or bear a clearly substantial
similarity to the original work, since web pages make it possible to
simply select and download any portion or entirety of the content
posted online. In UMG v. Mp3.com, the infringing digital music files
were identical copies of the plaintiff record label's copyrighted work.53
The electronic images at issue in Kelly v. Arriba Soft were also exact
copies, which the defendant downloaded from the plaintiff's photogra-
phy website and reduced in size in order to index them in an image
search engine. 54 Similarly, the court in Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Webb-
world, Inc. found copying to exist where the evidence consisted of
"twenty-nine tabs with the relevant copyright registration, a photocopy
of the copyrighted images, and copies of identical images
49 Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1970) ("To
constitute an infringement under the Act there must be substantial similarity between the
infringing work and the work copyrighted; and that similarity must have been caused by the
defendant's having copied the copyright holder's creation.")
50 Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164
(9th Cir. 1977).
51 Id.
52 Ferguson v. NBC, Inc., 584 F.2d 111 (5th Cir. 1978).
53 UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
54 Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 819 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that defendant's
temporary copying of plaintiff's digital photographs fell within the fair use exception because
defendant only used plaintiff's images to create tiny thumbnail images for an image search
engine).
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downloaded from the Netpics site," some of which still "self-
proclaim[ed] their origin by bearing a PEI title or emblem." 55 In many
online copying cases, the issue of copying becomes a question of
substantiality, rather than a question of similarity.
56
The question of substantiality is particularly relevant to the
treatment of intermediate copies under current copyright law. Interme-
diate copies are copies made automatically by the computer and stored
for an indefinite, but temporary period on a computer system or server.
A digital copy is not a material object as specified within Section 501
of the Copyright Act, since "[m]aterial objects cannot be transmitted
over the information superhighway ... only immaterial digital works
are capable of such transmission. '57 But courts, in addressing the issue
of substantiality as it pertains to temporary copying, have held that an
ephemeral copy may violate the right of reproduction, even though
legislative intent may seem to suggest otherwise. 58 Copyright attaches
to the expression fixed in the computer code itself, which may be
transferred through the Internet in an instant and may be viewed "with
the aid of a machine or device" such as computer software or hardware,
as an image, text, video, or as an entire web page layout.59 Every
version of the work, prepared at any point in time, constitutes a separate
copy, so every viewing of a web page creates a new copy and theoreti-
cally triggers liability. 60 Even the act of loading a software program in
the random access memory (RAM), which is automatically erased
when the user turns off the computer,
55 Playboy Enter. V. Webbworld, Inc., 991 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Tex. 1997).
56 Attorney Ian C. Ballon discusses the relationship between fair use and time in cyber-
space and suggests that "in Cyberspace, where text can be copied more quickly, thoroughly and
inexpensively than on a photocopy machine, and combined with graphics, visual images,
sound and software, the issues raised by the Second Circuit" in the Texaco case, which deals
with the effect of photocopying technology, "are more complex." Ian C. Ballon, Pinning the
Blame in Cyberspace: Toward a Coherent Theory for Imposing Vicarious Copyright, Trade-
mark and Tort Liability for Conduct Occurring Over the Internet, 18 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT.
L. J. 729, 739 (1996) (referring to Ain. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 37 F.3d 881, 913
(2d Cir. 1994)).
57 Henry 0. Towner, Comment, Copyright Law on the Information Superhighway: A
Critical Analysis of the Proposed, 7 REGENT U.L. REv. 261 (1996).
58 Bruce P. Keller & Jeffrey P. Cunard, Copyright in the Digital Age, 754 PATENTS,
COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, AND LITERARY PROPERTY COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 293,
302-03 (Jul. 2003) ("These decisions-at least with respect to RAM storage-are somewhat
inconsistent with the House Report on the 1976 Copyright Act, which stated that the definition
of fixation would exclude from the concept purely evanescent or transient re-productions such
as those ... captured momentarily in the memory of a computer.") (internal quotes omitted).
59 Id.; 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2002).
60 MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518-19 (9th Cir. 1993).
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constitutes making a copy within the definition of Section 501, accord-
ing to the court in MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc..61 Instead of
focusing on the permanence of the copy, the MAI court focused on the
issue of fixation and found "no specific facts ... which indicate that the
copy created in the RAM is not fixed," since the RAM copy of the
software was "sufficiently permanent" for a computer technician to
"view the system error log" of the program.62 Section 117 of the
Copyright Act carves out a narrow exception for the owner of software
and permits the owner to make a copy of the program if the copy is for
archival purposes or is "an essential step in the utilization of the
computer program." 63 But the exception did not apply in MAI, since the
computer technician, and not the owner, made use of the RAM copy.
Copying occurs even where the software is loaded from a permanent
storage medium and merely copied into RAM for the purpose of
booting up the software. 64 In a string of subsequent holdings, courts in
other jurisdictions followed the MAI holding and held that intermediate
copying constitutes a use of the right of reproduction.
65
In the wake of technological developments, the MAI case and
subsequent holdings were problematic because they created the possi-
bility of infringement liability for unwitting Internet users, ISPs and
software owners. Intermediate copies are automatically created by
61 Id.
62 Id. at 518.
63 Id. at 518-519. See 17 U.S.C. § 117 (2002) ("[I]t is not an infringement for the owner
of a copy of a computer program to make or authorize the making of another copy or adaptation
of that computer program provided: (1) that such a new copy or adaptation is created as an
essential step in the utilization of the computer program in conjunction with a machine and that
it is used in no other manner, or (2) that such new copy or adaptation is for archival purposes
only and that all archival copies are destroyed in the event that continued possession of the
computer program should cease to be rightful."). See also Sega Enters. v. Accolade, Inc., 785
F. Supp. 1392, 1399 ("This narrow exception to the copyright act allows an owner of a program
to load it into his computer for use, which involves making a copy in the machine memory.");
C'f discussion of Accolade, Inc. infra in note 137.
6 Stenograph L.L.C. v. Bossard Assocs., Inc., 144 F.3d 96, 101 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ("Courts
that have addressed the issue agree that the loading of software from some permanent storage
medium, such as a floppy disk or a computer's hard drive, to the computer's random access
memory (RAM) when the software is 'booted up' causes a copy to be made").
65 MAI Sys. Corp., 991 F.2d at 518-19 (loading operating system software into RAM
constituted making a copy within the meaning of the Copyright Act, even if the copy disap-
pears after the computer is turned off). See Accolade, Inc., 785 F. Supp. 1392 (holding that
intermediate copying still constituted copying and that defendant was liable for using a code
disassembler to make intermediate copies of the plaintiff's video game, alter the assembly
language code and market a new game); Triad Sys. Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co., 64 F.3d
1330, 1335 (9th Cir. 1995) (loading operating system into RAM constituted copying), cert.
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computers or by ISPs to decrease the time it takes to download
content.66 A service provider may copy a popular file from a remote
server (i.e., 'cache' the file), or even copy substantially all of the
contents of another server (i.e., 'mirror' it) to meet subscriber requests
for information on a timely basis and to conserve scarce technological
resources. 67 Likewise, an Internet user may mirror or cache a file on his
computer, whether intentionally or unintentionally, to hasten the down-
load of a web site.68 Congress introduced the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (DMCA) to address the liability issues that arise for
software owners and ISPs. 69 Title III of the Act, the Computer Mainte-
nance Competition Assurance Act, exempts from liability copies of a
computer program made on a computer that "lawfully contains an
authorized copy of the computer program" and made only for
"purposes ... of maintenance or repair of that machine. ' 70 The copies
must be used only for maintenance or repair and removed from the
system after maintenance or repair. 71 Title II of the Act, the Online
Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act, limits the liability of
ISPs for copyright infringement.72 "[T]he DMCA creates a safe harbor
for service providers who create intermediate and temporary copies as
part of an 'automatic technical process' involved in routing or transmit-
ting communications among Internet users. 73 This exemption covers
infringing communications that may arise from system caching and
linking. The DMCA defines a service provider as "an entity offering
the transmission, routing, or providing of connections for digital online
communications. '74 In order for the ISP to be eligible for protection,
the user must specify communications points and select the content of
the communications, without modification by the ISP. The protection
offered under Section 512 hinges on whether the ISP either knows or
has the opportunity to know about the infringement, such as by review-
ing and editing the content that it transmits.75 Although the
denied, 516 U.S. 1145 (1996).
66 See Keller & Cunard, supra note 59, at 302-03.
67 See id
68 Id.
69 17U.S.C. § 117,512(2004).
70 § 117.
71 Id.
72 § 512. Additionally, the TEACH act creates a safe harbor for transmissions made in the
course of long distance education.
13 Keller & Cunard, supra note 59, at 302-03.
74 § 512.
75 Costar Group, Inc. v. Loopnet, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 2d 688, 696, 698 n. 4 (D. Md. 2001).
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DMCA deals with the issue of intermediate copying for ISPs and
software owners, it does not address the issue of whether Internet users
should be liable for intermediate copying. 76 Current law imposes the
blanket rule of strict liability for the user who downloads web-posted
materials, regardless of intent and the intermediate status of the materi-
als. To fend off infringement claims, those who download Web-posted
materials, whether intentionally or unintentionally through browser
caching, must justify the copying as fair use or as permitted under an
implied license or under consent by the owner of the copyright.
77
The clash between fair use and existing copyright policy raises
ambiguities in several fact scenarios, where the digital nature of the use
seems to mitigate infringement liability. A singer-songwriter posts
digital audio files of her music on her official website, and an overzeal-
ous fan adds them to his poorly-designed unofficial fan website. A law
student vents his woes in a scathing post to his online journal, and an
anonymous reader borrows large portions of the text and uses them as
content for her website about law students and depression. A novice
graphic designer borrows the HTML of well-crafted webpage in order
to use the design on his site, but replaces the graphics and the text of
the website with his own. A website automatically makes archived
copies of every website online for the purpose of preserving the history
of the Internet? 8 These uses of co-
76 Keller & Cunard, supra note 59, 302-03.
17 See supra text accompanying note 59. Keller defines web caching as the process of
"automatically sav[ing] a copy of all Web pages being viewed to the user's local disk drive"
and further notes that "more traditional defenses to copyright infringement ... such as fair use
or an implied license or consent by owner of the copyright in the cached material" may still
apply to the cached materials that the DMCA does not exempt. Mathias Strasser, Beyond
Napster: How the Law Might Respond to a Changing Internet Architecture, 22 N. KY. L. REV.
660, 667-68 (2001) (discussing the fact that small-scale infringement is something "artists have
to live with both in real space and in cyberspace"). But see also Lydia Pallas Loren, Digitiza-
tion, Commodification, Criminalization: The Evolution of Criminal Copyright, 77 Wash. U. L.
Q. 835, 854 (1999) (noting that within the context of criminal copyright law although
"unauthorized copying of little significance is not worth the effort of finding, pursuing, and
punishing the culprit," copyright owners have nevertheless sometimes noted that "copyright
owners have pursued small-scale infringers with allegations of civil infringement in order to
discourage other potential infringers").
78 Internet Archive, available at http://www.archive.org (last visited Apr. 2004). This fact
scenario exists in reality. Internet Archive is a non-profit organization that was founded to
create an Internet library with the purpose of offering permanent access for researchers,
historians, and scholars to historical collections that exist in digital format. The Internet
Archive retries web pages periodically and stores the data for retrieval via a searchable
database.
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pyrighted material raise a question of whether the copyright holder's
right to control the work should outweigh the Internet user's right to
use it - and whether the copyright owner's choice to make the works
available online for free should tip the argument in favor of fair use.
II.
THE FAIR USE LIMITATION ON COPYRIGHT PROTECTION
The domain of intellectual property protection under copyright
law is finite. 79 Section 106 of the Copyright Act endows the owner of
a copyright with "a potent arsenal of remedies against the infringer of
his [or her] work," but even under the strict liability regime of copy-
right, these remedies are subject to certain limitations.80 Just as the
grant of property in a deed defines the "metes and bounds" of real
property, Sections 107 through 118 of the Copyright Act define the
outer boundaries of the copyright holder's intellectual property by
establishing a system of compulsory licensing and by carving out
limitations on the six exclusive rights granted by Section 106, such as
exceptions for evanescent copies and exceptions for certain types of
uses. 81 The structure of the Copyright Act creates tension between the
79 John Tessensohn, The Devil's in the Details: The Quest for Legal Protection oJ
Computer Databases and the Collections of Information Act, 38 IDEA 439, 474 (1998).
Tessensohn lists "the longer, but finite, life of copyrights" as an example of the "careful
balances" in intellectual property law "between what's set aside for the owner and what's left
in the public domain for the rest of us."
80 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2002) (specifying that the copyright owner's exclusive rights are
"[s]ubject to sections 107 and 122). See Peer Int'l. Corp. v. Luna Records, Inc., 887 F. Supp.
560, 570 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417,
433-34) ("The Copyright Act provides the owner of a copyright with a potent arsenal of
remedies against an infringer of his [or her] work, including an injunction to restrain the
infringer from violating his [or her] rights [and] the impoundment and destruction of all
reproductions of his [or her] work made in violation of his [or her] rights"). See also supra note
22 and accompanying text (examining copyright as a strict liability system).
81 Professor Gordon discusses the limitations that arise in applying real property theory
to intangible, intellectual property and acknowledges "the boundaries of intangibles will be
less precise than the metes and bounds of realty," a catchphrase that surfaces in older property
cases such as Whitridge v. City of Baltimore, 63 A. 808, 809 (Md. 1906) ("[m]etes and bounds
in the description of property granted, if established, always control courses and distances.").
Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of Consistency,
Consent, and Encouragement Theory, 41 STANFORD L. REv. 1343, 1383 (1989). Gordon
asserts that courts must be "vigilant in enforcing copyright's limits lest the public be chilled in
its proper use of the unprotected aspects of a work." Initially a common law doctrine and
codified in the Copyright Act of 1976, the fair use defense carves out a significant limitation
on the rights of copyright holders because it "has, by far, the broadest applicability of all of the
limitations on the rights of copyright holders" - it can be applied to all six of the exclusive
rights granted to copyright holder. See John Kennedy et al., Copyright: Foundations and
Progress, in INTERNET LAW AND PRACTICE: INTERNATIONAL CONTRIBUTORS (December
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growth of new technology and the copyright owner's interest in con-
trolling use of the work.82 In the jurisprudence of digital copyright
infringement, this tension reflects the "evolving allocation of power
between copyright owners and copyright-using Internet
entrepreneurs." 83 The copyright holder has the burden of proving that
the defendant has infringed the rights enumerated in Section 106 in an
action for copyright infringement. 84 But after the copyright holder
meets the burden of proof, the putative infringer may escape liability
by showing that the infringing use falls into one of the statutory
exemptions provided by the Copyright Act.
One of the exceptions to the rule against copying is the Section
107 fair use exception, which creates a complete defense to infringe-
ment by exempting certain uses from infringement if they are "fair."85
Fair use is an affirmative defense that places on the defendant "the
burden of production and persuasion to show that the exception [and
the defense] is applicable. ' 86 Use of a work is considered "fair" if the
defendant can show that the work is used for the purposes of "criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching [including multiple co-
2003). See also Marshall Leaffer, Character Merchandising in the U.K., A Nostalgic Look, 11
U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REv. 453, 454 (1994) ("In order to create and maintain an
efficient system of intellectual property rights-or any kind of property rights for that matter-an
individual must be capable of knowing who owns what. Thus, a major goal of any intellectual
property regime is to transform the inherently vague boundaries of intellectual property into
something which is more concrete ... In other words, to organize an efficient market, an
individual must determine the metes and bounds of the property right in question.").
82 Fred von Lohmann, Fair Use and Digital Rights Management: Preliminary Thoughts
on the (Irreconcilable?) Tension between Them, at http://www.eff.org/IP/DRM/
fair-use and drm.html (March 23, 2004).
83 Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright and Excuse on the Internet, 24 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS
1, 1-2 (2000) (discussing Internet-related issues on topics such as "technological protection
measures and copyright management information; fair use and linking; 'private' copying
online services; and choice of law issues posed by foreign websites accessible in the U.S.").
84 Polygram Int'l Pub., Inc. v. Nevada/TIG, Inc. 855 F. Supp. 1314, 1321 (D. Mass. 1994)
("To prevail, [plaintiffs] have the burden of proving that users of the Betamax have infringed
their copyrights and that Sony should be held responsible for that infringement."). See also
Catherine Palo, Copyright Infringement Litigation, 77 AM. JUR. TRIALS 449 n. 1 (2003) ("To
establish infringement, counsel for plaintiff must show: Substantial similarity between the
allegedly infringing work and the plaintiffs work.").
85 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2002); Ass'n. of Am. Med. Coils. v. Mikaelian, 571 F. Supp. 144,
151 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
86 Mikaelian, 571 F. Supp. at 151 ("Since the fair use exception to the Copyright Act is
an affirmative defense to a suit for copyright infringement, the party asserting the exception
bears the burden of production and persuasion to show that the exception (and the defense) is
applicable.").
62 THE PROTECTION OF WEB-POSTED M TERIALS [Vol. 3:46
pies for classroom use], scholarship, or research. '87 To determine
whether a use is fair, a court must weigh the factors outlined in Sections
107(1) through 107(4), including the "purpose and character of the
use[,] ... the nature of the copyrighted work[,] ... the amount and
substantiality of the portion used[,] ... and the effect of use on the
potential market for the work or on the value of the copyrighted
work. '88 The fair use exception may apply to a work regardless of
whether it is published, since "[t]he fact that a work is unpublished
shall not itself bar a finding of fair use" in light of fair use factors.
89
Because the fair use balancing test is "an equitable rule of reason," the
jurisprudence of the fair use inquiry is derived from an "endless variety
of situations and combinations of circumstances" and hinges on the
case-by-case construction of the fair use statute. 90 Even though the fair
use inquiry has been codified, "courts must be free to adapt the doctrine
to particular situations on a case-by-case basis," and as a result, the fair
use inquiry is dynamic, rather than static - it "deflies] precise defini-
tion by statute or analysis" and cannot be "reduced to a single form




90 See Matthew W. Wallace, Analyzing Fair Use Claims: A Quantitative and Paradig-
matic Approach, 9 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 121, 122, 126 (1992) (citing Sony Corp.
of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 448 (1984)). See also Elizabeth Troup
Timkovich, The New Significance of the Four Fair Use Factors as Applied to Parody:
Interpreting the Court's Analysis in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 5 Tul. J. of Tech. &
Intell. Prop. 61, 63 (2003) ("The fair use doctrine, though not nullifying the original copyright,
thus allows licenses for certain uses of a copyrighted work that are judged 'fair."'). See, e.g.,
Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985); Sony Corp. of Am. V.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 448 (1984).
91 Critics of the fair use doctrine take issue with the fact that "the fair use doctrine has not
been reduced to a single form susceptible of straightforward application." Professor McJohn
notes, for example, that even after decades of litigation, "the application of fair use to
photocopying is unsettled." Wallace, supra note 91, at 122; Stephen M. McJohn, Fair Use and
Privatization in Copyright, 35 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 61, 62 (1998). Professor McJohn also takes
issue with the fact that the fair use doctrine is "so malleable as to be indeterminate," producing
variable results and "a disproportionate share of reversals and divided courts." Professor Cate
elaborates on the difficulty of predicting "the fair use calculus" and notes that it is "insufficient
to provide the clarity and specificity required to ensure adequate access." Moreover, fair use
litigation is often "expensive and burdensome for the parties involved." Fred H. Cate, The
Technological Transformation of Copyright Law, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1395, 1457-59 (1996). As
an alternative to the confusion of fair use, Professor Lipton proposes the idea of imposing an
affirmative legal duty on property holders to ensure that "certain uses of the copyrighted work
are facilitated," instead of "placing an onus on private individuals to bear the costs of asserting
an often ill-defined fair use defense to an alleged copyright infringement. Jacqueline Lipton,
Information Property: Rights and Responsibilities, 56 FLORIDA L. REv. 135, 167 (2004).
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"inherent tension between free speech and property rights in
expression." 92 Fair use carries out the "ultimate aim of the Copyright
Act to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good" by
"preserv[ing] public access to the ideas and functional elements" and
by ensuring that copyright holders do not secure an overbroad monop-
oly over expression.93 It is important to consider the fair use doctrine in
gauging the copyright protection of online works "[a]s digital technol-
ogies expand the possibilities for creative works," since the protection
hinges on the "breadth of the fair use doctrine" which affects "the
control given [to] copyright holders." 94 Fair use plays a central role in
the conflict between Internet users and copyright holders, since Internet
users generally seek a broad construction of fair use, whereas copyright
holders seek a narrow construction. 95
For copyright defendants, the fair use inquiry articulated in
Section 107 is both an alternative to implied license defense and an
alternate approach to the ambiguity surrounding the existence and
scope of implied licenses in web posted materials.96 It is difficult to
separate fair use and licensing because defendants in a number of
copyright cases have presented the implied license theory as a defense
in conjunction with the fair use defense. 97 Both fair use and implied
92 Triangle Publ'ns, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc. 626 F.2d 1171, 1181 (1980)
(citing Robert C. Denicola, Copyright and Free Speech: Constitutional Limitations on the
Protection of Expression, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 283, 299, 303-04 (1979)).
93 Sony Computer Entm't, Inc. v. Connectix Corp. 203 F.3d 596, 603 (2000) ("Some
economic loss by Sony as a result of this competition does not compel a finding of no fair use,"
even though "Sony understandably seeks control over the market for devices that play games
Sony produces or licenses. The copyright law, however, does not confer such a monopoly." Id.
at 607). Cf., James V. Mahon, Note, A Commentary on Proposals for Copyright Protection on
the National Information Infrastructure, 22 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 233 (1996).
94 See McJohn, supra note 92, at 62.
95 See id.; see also Matthew Fagin, Frank Pasquale, and Kim Weatherall, Beyond
Napster: Using Antitrust Law to Advance and Enhance Online Music Distribution, 8 B. U. J.
SCI. & TECH. L. 451, 481 (2002) ("The fair use doctrine serves important constitutional
purposes, serving to balance, among other things, First Amendment concerns against copyright
owners' legitimate interests in controlling distribution of their work. It enables use for purposes
important to the public interest, such as criticism, comment, parody, and news reporting. In
general, however, courts have not been very receptive to fair use arguments raised in the
context of the new music distribution technologies.").
96 Stephen J. Davidson, Scott J. Bergs, and Miki Kapsner, Open, Click, Download, Send
What Have You Agreed To? The Possibilities Seem Endless, Georgetown University Law
Center Continuing Legal Education 16th Advanced Computer and Internet Law Institute (2003).
17 David L. Hayes, Application of Copyright Rights to Specific Acts on the Internet, 15
No. 8 COMPUTER LAWYER 1, 5-6 (1998) (discussing the application of fair use and implied
license in conjunction and noting "reliance on the implied license doctrine carries substantial
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license defense are based on principles of equity. 98 The implied license
defense is closely tied to the fair use defense, since some commentators
view the fair use doctrine as a statutory mechanism that creates com-
pulsory licenses for certain uses deemed to be "fair." 99 One key differ-
ence between the implied license defense and the fair use defense is
that the implied license establishes the existence of a contract, albeit an
implied contract, and supersedes the fair use defense, which may be
preempted if any kind of license, implied or express, exists. 00 An
express license arises when "the parties manifest their assent or agree-
ment by oral or written words" to permit the use of a work."'' 1 An
implied license, on the other hand, only arises "in narrow circum-
stances where one party created a work at the other's request and
handed it over, intending that [the other party] copy and distribute
it." °10 2 Like fair use, the implied license may exist "even absent an
express license by the copyright owner," provided that the copyright
holder's actions "bar it from suing another for copyright infringement
based 'on particular uses of the work," such as when the copyright
holder intends that the user copy and distribute the work. 10 3 The
implied license constitutes a complete affirmative defense to infringe-
ment and also preempts fair use to the extent that the fair use inquiry is
irrelevant where the defendant already has an implied license. 104 None-
theless, if the implied license defense fails, court may still find that the
use is exempt from infringement under the doctrine of fair use.
105
The issue of whether a license exists, whether express or im-
plied, is relevant to the discussion of web-posted materials because
copying online content is simple, instantaneous and sometimes inci-
legal uncertainty").
98 See Richard S. Vermut, File Caching on the Internet: Technical Infringement or
Safeguardfor Efficient Network, 4 J. INTELL. PROP. 273 (1997).
99 Timkovich, supra note 91, at 63 ("The fair use doctrine, though not nullifying the
original copyright, thus allows licenses for certain uses of a copyrighted work that are judged
'fair.' There is no bright-line rule stating which uses qualify under the fair use exception. The
doctrine is one of equity, and must be decided on a case-by-case basis." (internal citations
omitted)).
100 See supra note 96.
101 I.A.E., Inc. v. Shaver, 74 F.3d 768, 776 n. 12 (7th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted).
102 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1026 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal
quotes omitted).
103 See supra note 94.
104 Michaels v. Internet Entm't Group, 5 F. Supp. 2d 823 (C.D. Cal 1998) (citing Rano v.
Sipa Press, 987 F.2d 580 (9th Cir. 1992)).
105 See supra note 95.
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dental to web browsing. 06 In an online transaction, for example, the
host computer sends the user "a copy of the copyrighted work for
storage in the RAM memory of the user computer, possible storage on
the hard drive of the user's computer, and display by the user's
browser."' 0 7 Under the Copyright Act's statute of frauds, only a trans-
fer of copyright ownership requires a "valid ... instrument of convey-
ance" for the transfer of copyright ownership, so a non-exclusive
license may be created even if there is no written agreement. 0 s An
implied digital license raises additional issues, such as whether it
allows unlimited non-commercial copies, distribution of copies, or
sales of copies. 0 9 In order to prevent would-be infringers from assert-
ing implied license and fair use as defenses, online copyright holders
increasingly dictate the terms of use in an express license simultane-
ously bars the application of the fair use doctrine, since fair uses "are
not insulated against breach of contract claims," even though they
"cannot constitute copyright infringement."' i 0 For many digital copy-
right holders, drafting has become a viable alternative to the protracted
litigation process that may accompany a battle over the terms of an
implied license or a battle over the applicability of the fair use
doctrine. "'1
The first step of the fair use inquiry is to determine whether the
"purpose and character of the use" are fair, by examining factors such
as "whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit
educational purposes." 112 The preamble to Section 107 lists examples
of some of these nonprofit acceptable purposes, "such as criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching [including multiple copies for
classroom use], scholarship, or research."' 1 3 But the nonprofit charac-
ter of a work must be weighed in conjunction with the commercial use
factor, in either finding for or against a finding of fair
106 See supra note 56.
107 See supra note 94.
108 Effects Associates, Inc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555, 558 (9th Cir. 1990). See 17 U.S.C.
§ 204(a) (2005).
19 See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
"0 Nathan Smith, The Shrinkwrap Snafu: Untangling the "Extra Element" in Breach oJ
Contract, 2003 BYU L. Rev. 1373, 1374-75 (2003) 1374-75. See also ProCD, Inc. v. Zeiden-
berg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) (discussing shrinkwrap licenses).
"' See supra note 47, discussion of Creative Commons as an example of a novel organ-
ization that promotes licensing so that copyright holders can avoid having to deal with im-
plied license or fair use issues.
112 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2002).
113 Id.
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use. 114 Whether a use is commercial or noncommercial depends on
whether the defendant reaps "some indirect economic advantage from
copying," regardless of whether that benefit is "direct" and regardless
of whether the objective of copying is to "serve a broader public
purpose."" 15 The economic advantage is not gauged by the remunera-
tive nature of the use, but rather by whether the copies are "made to
save the expense of purchasing authorized copies, since "the definition
of a financially motivated transaction for the purposes of criminal
copyright actions includes trading infringing copies of a work for other
items, including receipt of other copyrighted works."" 6 A finding of
commercial use does not necessarily preclude a finding of fair use,
since a conclusive presumption against commercial uses "would swal-
low nearly all of the illustrative uses listed in the preamble paragraph
of [Section 107]" and "cause the fair use analysis to collapse."17 Com-
mercial use is merely "one element of the first factor inquiry into its
purpose and character" and must be weighed with other elements of the
purpose and character inquiry. 1 18
Another element of the purpose and character inquiry is
whether the work is transformative in nature. Courts have held that the
purpose and character inquiry must also delve into "whether and to
what extent the new work is transformative" by determining whether
14 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 584-85 (1994).
115 Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 922 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding that
researchers at for-profit laboratory gained indirect economic advantage by photocopying
copyrighted scholarly articles). See also Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F.
Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (revenues of reprographic business stemmed directly from selling
unauthorized photocopies of copyrighted books); Worldwide Church of God v. Philadelphia
Church of God, Inc., 227 F.3d 1110, 1119 (9th Cir. 2000) ("stating that church that copied
religious text for its members unquestionably profited from the unauthorized distribution and
use of the text without having to account to the copyright holder").
116 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1015 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing No
Electronic Theft Act, Pub.L. No. 105-147, 18 U.S.C. § 101 (defining "Financial Gain")).
117 Am. Geophysical Union, 60 F.3d at 921 ("'Indeed, Campbell warns against elevat-
ing... to a per se rule' Sony's language about a presumption against fair use arising from
commercial use.") (adopting the Campbell court's standard for measuring the transformative
nature of a work and recognizing that "the more transformative the new work, the less will be
the significance of other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair
use."); 4 Nimmer on Copyright § 13.05[A][1][c], at 13-163, 13-164.
118 Worldwide Church of God, 227 F.3d at 1117 (citing Campbell, the Court notes that
the "Supreme Court has cautioned that 'the commercial or nonprofit educational purpose of a
work is only one element of the first factor inquiry into its purpose and character"'). See also
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 450 (1984) ("Even copying
for noncommercial purposes may impair the copyright holder's ability to obtain the rewards
that Congress intended him to have.").
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the otherwise infringing use "adds something new, with a further
purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression,
meaning, or message."" 9 A use that does not supersede the original
use, but rather "create[s] a different purpose for the image . . . is
transformative."' 20 Parody, for example, is a transformative work
because it "can provide social benefit, by shedding light on an earlier
work, and, in the process, creating a new one."121 But a parodic work
only qualifies as transformative under the fair use doctrine if it
"reasonably could be perceived as commenting on the original or
criticizing it, to some degree."' 122 Even though the fair use statute does
expressly acknowledge this element, the transformative inquiry is
important because it can supersede other factors - "[t]he more trans-
formative the new work, the less important the other factors, including
commercialism, become."' 123 A transformative work is less likely to
merit fourth fair use factor-market harm-since it is "less likely to
have an adverse impact on the market of the original than a work that
merely supersedes the copyrighted work."' 124 Moreover, a transforma-
tive work merits more fair use protection than a new work that "merely
supersedes the objects of the original opinion," because "[s]uch works
... lie at the heart of the fair use doctrine's guarantee of breathing space
within the confines of copyright."' 125 A court may find in favor of fair
use even if the work is not transformative, but a finding that "use is for
the same intrinsic purpose as [the copyright holder's] ... seriously
weakens a claimed fair use. ' 126 In the context of the inquiry into the
purpose and character of use, courts are less likely to find that
119 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) ("The central purpose of
this investigation is to see, in Justice Story's words, whether the new work merely supersedes
the objects of the original creation or instead adds something new, with a further purpose or
different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message; it asks, in other
words, whether and to what extent the new work is "transformative") (internal quotes omitted).
120 Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 280 F.3d 934, 941-42 (9th Cir. 2002) ("Because Arriba's
use is not superseding Kelly's use but, rather, has created a different purpose for the images,
Arriba's use is transformative.")
121 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
122 Id. at 583.
123 Kelly, 280 F.3d at 940.
124 Kelly, 280 F.3d at 943.
125 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
126 Worldwide Church of God v. Philadelphia Church of God, Inc., 227 F.3d 1110, 1117
(9th Cir. 2000) ("Although 'transformative use is not absolutely necessary for a finding of fair
use', where the 'use is for the same intrinsic purpose as [the copyright holder's, such use
seriously weakens a claimed fair use."') (citing Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 and Weissmann v.
Freeman, 868 F.2d 1313, 1324 (2d Cir. 1989)).
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exact copies are transformative and are "reluctant to find fair use when
an original work is merely retransmitted in a different medium.'
' 27
The second prong of the fair use inquiry involves assessing the
"nature of the copyrighted work" itself, to determine the level of
protection that the work merits.1 28 Protection under copyright law,
unlike protection under patent law, only requires work to meet a de
minimis standard of originality, but nevertheless a "modicum of crea-
tivity" is required. 29 Citing a string of fair use cases that juxtaposed
creative works with factual works, the court in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose
Music held that creative works, such as fictional stories, motion pic-
tures, and creative works, "are closer to the core of intended copyright
protection than others" and merit a higher level of protection in fair use
cases. 130 Works that are factual or functional in nature, on the other
hand, are severely limited in protection under the fact/expression
dichotomy and are only subject to a limited copyright that extends only
to those components of the work that are original to the author, not the
facts themselves.' 31 The limited copyright applies only to factual works
that are "selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the
resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship,"
where, for example, the author "chooses which facts to include, in what
order to place them, and how to arrange the data so that readers may
use them effectively."' 132 In other words, a limited copyright may apply
if the method of selection applied to the content is original, even if the
content alone is not copyrightable. 133 Courts have applied this limited
copyright in fair uses cases to yield only a limited degree of protection
for the copyrighted elements that does not bar users from making
intermediate copies of the work to access the non-copyrighted
information. 34 The* degree of copyright protection that accompanies
the nature of the work is relevant to the digital fair use inquiry because
"the hybrid nature of computer programs" is also
127 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1015 (9th Cir. 2001).
128 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (2005).
129 Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
130 Campbell, U.S. at 586. For example, in the A&MRecords v. Napster case, the court
found against Napster because the copying involved inherently creative work. 239 F.3d at
1016. Citing Campbell, the court noted that "works that are creative in nature are closer to the
core of intended copyright protection than are more fact-based works." Id.
131 Feist, 499 U.S. 340.
132 Id.
13 RAYMOND T. NIMMER, I INFORMATION LAW, Chapter 3, (2004).
134 Assessment Techs. v. Wiredata, 350 F.3d 640, 645 (7th Cir. 2003).
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in web content. 35 Moreover, the nature of a copyrighted-work also
depends on whether it has been published, since "unpublished works
are the favorite sons of factor two," which raises the issue of whether
the availability of a work online constitutes publication under the fair
use doctrine.
136
The third prong of the fair use evaluation examines "the amount
and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted
work as a whole."'137 Copying a work in entirety "militates against a
finding of fair use," but it does not entirely preclude the possibility of
a fair use finding, since courts may "conclude that a use is fair even
when the protected work is copied in its entirety."'138 The acceptable
amount of copying depends first on a quantitative and qualitative
analysis of "the percentage of the original used" and is not governed by
"absolute rules.1' 39 Second, it depends on the analysis of the first factor,
135 Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1524 (9th Cir.1992). The court in
Accolade created an exception for intermediate copying under the fair use doctrine. In Acco-
lade, the defendant reverse-engineered the plaintiffs video game by transforming plaintiffs
machine-readable object code into human-readable source code. The defendant then used the
content of the raw code to create a development manual that detailed the requirements for
creating a game compatible with the plaintiff's video game system. The manual contained
"only functional descriptions of the interface requirements and did not include any of Sega's
code" Id. at 1515 and was held to consist of non-infringing content under the fair use doctrine.
Notably, the court stated that "[p]ublic benefit need not be direct or tangible, but may arise
because the challenged use serves a public interest." Id. at 1523. In Accolade, the plaintiff's
copying was fair, in part because the "identification of the functional requirements for Genesis
compatibility has led to an increase in the number of independently designed video game
programs offered for use with the Genesis console." Id. at 1523.
136 Wright v. Warner Books, Inc., 953 F.2d 731, 737 (2d Cir. 1991) (citations omitted)
(noting that "[t]he fact that a work is unpublished is a critical element of its 'nature"').
137 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (2005).
138 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1016 (9th Cir. 2001). The fair use
defense failed to shield the defendants from liability in the A&M Records case, where the
defendant facilitated the transmission of MP3 files between its users through peer-to-peer file
sharing. The defendant enabled users who used the defendant's software to access its system,
to "(1) make MP3 music files stored on individual computer hard drives available for copying
by other Napster users; (2) search for MP3 music files stored on other users' computers; and
(3) transfer exact copies of the contents of other users' MP3 files from one computer to another
via the Internet." Id. at 1011. The court in Napster found that the copying of entire songs in
MP3 format "militate[d] against a finding of fair use" because it constituted copying of the
entire work. Id. at 1016.
139 Basic Books Inc. v. Kinko's Graphic Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1533 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)
(citation omitted). In Basic Books, major publishing houses sued the defendant for photocop-
ying excerpts of copyrighted books without permission and selling them for a profit. The court
held that the third fair use factor "considers not only the percentage of the original used but also
the 'substantiality' of that portion to the whole of the work" so that the courts must "evaluate
the qualitative aspects as well as the quantity of material copied." Id. (citation omitted). The
court also noted that the availability of a work controlled whether the quantity copied was
appropriate, so that "longer portions copied from an out-of-print book may be fair
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the purpose of use, weighed in conjunction with the amount and
substantiality of the portion used.14 0 An exact copy may not necessarily
constitute an infringing use, and minimal copying (as distinguished
from de minimis copying, which is exempt from the fair use doctrine
and infringement altogether) does not necessarily constitute a fair use
either.' 4 1 For example, clearly the "amount and substantiality of the
portions appropriated, weigh[ed] against defendant" in Basic Books
Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., where the court held that a company
infringed the publisher's copyright by photocopying entire chapters of
the publisher's books for students. 142 But in contrast, the court in
Harper & Row, Publishers Inc. v. Nation Enters. held that a news
magazine infringed the book publisher's copyright and "appropriated
the heart" of the manuscript, merely by quoting and publishing "the
most interesting and moving parts" of an unpublished manuscript, even
though the quotations were an insubstantial portion of the entire
manuscript. 143 The fair use statute provides that the significance of the
portion used lies not only in how much of the work was taken, but also
the substance of that portion in relation to the work as a whole, since
"no plagiarist can excuse the wrong" by merely showing "how much
of the work he did not pirate."' 44
use because the book is no longer available." Id.
140 Id.
141 Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 56 (2d Cir. 1936) ("[No
plagiarist can excuse the wrong by showing how much of his work he did not pirate."). See also
Too Small For Fair Use: The De Minimis Defense, available at http://fairuse.stanford.edu/
Copyright and FairUseOverview/chapter9/9-b.html. ("Closely related to the amount and
substantiality component of the fair use defense is the de minimis defense, where "the amount
of material copies is so small (or "de minimis") that the court permits it without even
conducting a fair use analysis.").
142 Basic Books, 758 F. Supp. at 1533.
143 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 556, 600 (1985). In
Harper Row, the defendant magazine published unauthorized, verbatim quotations from a
purloined manuscript of Gerald Ford's presidential memoirs. The court placed an emphasis not
merely on the quantity, but also on the quality of the portions taken and found that "a taking
may not be excused merely because it is insubstantial with respect to the infringing work." Id.
at 565. The defendant was liable for publishing the magazine article because the text of the
article was "structured around" excerpts that were "expressive" and that served as "dramatic
focal points" in the work. Id. at 566.
144 Sheldon, 81 F.2d 49, 56 ("[N]o plagiarist can excuse the wrong by showing how much
of his work he did not pirate."). In Sheldon, the court found the defendant liable of copyright
infringement even though "much of the picture owes nothing to the play." Id.
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THE EFFECT OF FAIR USE ON WORKS POSTED ONLINE BY THE COPY-
RIGHT HOLDER
The duplication of a digital work is problematic because it is
easy.145 A digital work is work stored in binary code - that is, in "a
representation that consists of ones and zeros . . . understood by
computers. 146 The string of code "turn[s] analog data into a digital
representation that can be stored and manipulated by a computer," as
well as "'played back' to reproduce the original analog experience.' '147
A digital work is a work of authorship that exists in the form of code
and may be transferred through a tangible storage medium, such a
DVD, CD or diskette, or transferred electronically, such as through a
download or peer-to-peer file transfer. 148 Regardless of the content of
the data, the underlying information comprising a digital work "is
nothing more than a string of ones and zeroes" that "can always be
copied verbatim by a computer equipped with the right software."'149
Computer graphic software, for example, makes it possible not only to
duplicate a digital image but also makes it easy to alter the image's
appearance, convert format, or reduce its size.1 50 Few would interpret
141 Attorney Stephen M. Kramarsky lists the characteristics of digital information that
may either "offer a variety of benefits" or "create new and potentially disastrous issues for
copyright holder." These characteristics include "ease of duplication, electronic distribution,
compression and encryption." Stephen M. Kramarsky, Copyright Enforcement in the Internet
Age: the Law and Technology of Digital Rights Management, 11 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT.
1,4 (2001). But the so-called "CTRL-C" keystroke in the Windows operating system is a good
example of how easy it can be to make copies of digital content. By pressing these two keys,
any Windows user immediately makes an identical duplicate of the original file. John Baldry,
Using the Internet Windows, at http://www.btintemet.com/-john.baldry/ useyrpc/infsheet/
windows2.doc (Sept. 2002).
146 Kramarsky, supra note 147, at 3.
147 Kramarsky, supra note 147, at 4. But see id. at 4-5 (Kramarsky notes that "(t)here is
no way to make a perfect copy of an analog event." Regardless of the medium, an analog copy
shows "the grain of the photographic paper" or the "noise" of a recording. It is possible,
however, to digitize an analog source, such as by re-recording the contents of a cassette-tape
recording in a computer song file, thus creating "an imperfect (though often very good) copy.").
148 Katherine Elizabeth Macdonald, Comment, Speed Bump on the Information Super-
highway: Slowing Transmission ofDigital Works to Protect Copyright Owners, 63 LA. L. REV.
411, 431-32 (2003) (noting that with both types of digital content transfer, "the problem
remains the same: whether the legally obtained digital copy will be used as a 'master' for
illegally made copies that will then be redistributed to multiple third parties.").
149 Kramarsky, supra note 147, at 5.
10 Compression is a "process which reduces a file's overall size," where "ratios of 10:1
without serious degradation are possible with images, and up to 100:1 ... when compressing
video files." RICHARD RAYMAN ET AL., EMERGING TECHNOLOGY: FORMS & ANALYSIS,
appendix E, 1456 (2002). The JPEG is a "compression standard used to compress still pictures"
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the display of paintings at a public art gallery as an invitation to make
wholesale copies, even though a dedicated art student might make
sketches of the paintings, or incorporate ideas from the artwork in a
separate, original work of art-both uses that are clearly fair. '5' But the
ease of digital duplication and the anonymous nature of Internet brows-
ing make it possible not only to infringe the copyrights behind a digital
work, but also to make precise digital copies that may be far less likely
to pass muster under a fair use analysis than copies made from the
real-world originals. 152 The fact that "the making of high-quality repro-
duction of visual images has become easier, cheaper, and more widely
accessible" belies the fact that even a work posted on a high-traffic
website and freely viewed by Internet users over the world, is still
subject to copyright protection. 53
Many of the cases that deal with the fair use defense, as applied
to web-posted materials, hinge on the first Copyright Act Section 107
fair use factor-the purpose and character of the use. The statute does
not specify how the purpose or character of a use may incur liability,
but the commercial nature of the use is an element of the first factor that
is important in many fair use cases generally. 54 Commercial nature of
produced by the Joint Photographic Experts Group, a "group of hardware, software and
publishing entities focused on developing international standards for the compression of still
photographic images in digital systems." A thumbnail is "a small scale, typically low resolu-
tion, digital reproduction which has no intrinsic commercial or reproductive value." A PRO-
POSAL FOR EDUCATIONAL FAIR USE GUIDELINES FOR DIGITAL IMAGES, available at
http://www.utsystem.edu/ogc/intellectualproperty/imagguid.htm (revised Dec. 3, 1996)
[hereinafter the "PROPOSAL"].
151 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2002) (citing "teaching (including multiple copies for classroom
use), scholarship, or research" as permissible purposes under the fair use doctrine"); 17 U.S.C.
§ 102 (2002) (barring copyright protection for "idea, procedure, process, system, method of
operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described,
explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work"). See also 17 U.S.C. § 110 (Supp. II 2002)
(enumerating exceptions to fair use for works performed or displayed by educational or
non-profit organizations).
152 MacDonald, supra note 150, at 434.
153 A PROPOSAL FOR EDUCATIONAL FAIR USE GUIDELINES FOR DIGITAL IMAGES, supra
note 151 ("(T)he fact that images may be easily available does not automatically mean they can
be reproduced and reused without permission. Confusion regarding intellectual property rights
in visual images arises from the many ways that images are created and the many sources that
may be related to any particular image.").
'54 Compare Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985)
(finding against fair use where defendant published the "heart" of the work in a commercial
magazine), and Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding
against fair use where defendant made photocopies of copyrighted journals for archival and use
in corporate research and development), with Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios,
Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (finding of fair use where defendant manufactured videocassette
recorder that made possible the recording and home viewing of television programs).
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the use is not dispositive, since "the statute makes clear that a work's
commercial nature is only one element of the first factor enquiry," but
the "[c]ommercial use of copyrighted materials is less favored than
nonprofit use."'155 The fact that a user "stands to profit from exploita-
tion of the copyrighted material without paying the customary price"
weighs against fair use. 156 Clearly, "commercial use is demonstrated by
a showing that repeated and exploitative unauthorized copies were
made," such as downloading copies of video games or digital copies of
songs in order to avoid having to buy them. 15 7 Courts have also held
that even if the copyright holder posted an original work online for free
download, user sale of a copy of that work constitutes a commercial
use, although the fact that the content is available for free may some-
what mitigate a finding of commercial use.158 However, a financially
motivated transaction may also include "trading infringing copies of a
work for other items, including the receipt of other copyrighted
works."' 59 Furthermore, the mere proffer of copied mater-
155 Assoc. of Am. Med. Coils. v. Mikaelian, 571 F. Supp. 144, 152 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (Fair
use favors non-commercial use because it "encourage(s) education without raising the costs of
nonprofit institutions," whereas (p)rofit-making institutions, if they are making use of copy-
righted materials, should be capable of negotiating and paying to the copyright holder a fair fee
for the use of the protected work." The court notes, however, that "the mere fact that a
copyright user is a commercial enterprise will not preclude the applicability of the fair use
defense." (quoting Warner Bros., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Co., Inc., 523 F. Supp. 611 (S.D.N.Y.
1981)).
156 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562 (citing Roy Export Co. Establishment v. Columbia
Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 503 F. Supp. 1137, 1144 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); 4 Nimmer § 13.05[A][1],
at 13-71, n. 25.3.). The defendant in Harper & Row argued that "the purpose of news reporting
is purely commercial," but the court rejected the argument, stressing that "[t]he crux of the
profit/nonprofit distinction is not whether the sole motive of the use is monetary gain but
whether the user stands to profit from exploitation of the copyrighted material without paying
the customary price." The effect of the defendant's appropriation of copyrighted text in Harper
& Row was to deprive the plaintiff of the "commercially valuable fight of first publication."
Even though the Harper & Row decision was made in 1985, it is directly relevant to fact
scenarios raised in Part I of this paper because it recognizes that the commerciality of the use
is sometimes a matter of market control. The putative infringer who re-posts a text on his
website may not derive any monetary gain from the act, but the re-publication clashes with the
copyright holder's right to exclusively publish the work. See also discussion of Los Angeles.
Times v. Free Republic infra note 162 and accompanying text.
157 A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1020 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting
Worldwide Church of God v. Philadelphia Church of God, 227 F.3d 1110, 1117-18 (9th
Cir.2000); Sega Enters. Ltd. v. MAPHIA, 857 F. Supp. 679, 687 (N.D. Cal. 1994)). See also
discussion of A & M Records supra note 140.
15s Micro Star v. Formgen, Inc., 154 F.3d 1107, 1110 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that the
defendant was liable for packaging and selling game levels created by users of the plaintiffs
game, even if the plaintiffposted encouraged users to create and trade the levels freely online).
'19 Citing the No Electronic Theft Act, the court in A&M Records, Inc. v. NapsterInc.
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ials on another website may constitute commercial use, even if the site
is not for profit and collects no fees, because the site may incorporate
"commercial aspects," such as generating goodwill from advertisers,
attracting site visitors, or otherwise benefiting from copied materials
without having purchased them. 60 However, the lack of exploitation,
or the lack of targeted exploitation, may mitigate the effect of a finding
of commercial nature of use, such as in the case of an image search
engine that automatically creates thumbnails of all images online.' 6' A
finding of commercial nature of use is "a matter of degree, not an
absolute."
62
The commerciality of the use is merely one component of the
inquiry into the purpose and character of the use. The transformative
nature of a work is also powerful in the context of the purpose and
character inquiry because "[t]he more transformative the new work, the
less important the other factors, including commercialism, become."
Recognizing the existence of factors beyond commerciality of the use,
noted that "the definition of a financially motivated transaction for the purposes of criminal
copyright actions includes trading infringing copies of a work for other items." A&M Records,
Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d. 1004, 1015 (9th Cir. 2001). See No Electronic Theft (NET) Act,
18 U.S.C. § 101 (1997) (defining "Financial Gain").
160 The court in Los Angeles Times v. Free Republic rejected the defendants' claim for
fair use immunity even though the defendants generated neither revenue nor profits from
posting plaintiffs' articles on the site. "At most," noted the court, "they derive indirect
economic benefit by enhancing the website's cachet, increasing registrations, and hence
increasing donations and other forms of support," but even the indirect benefit permits
"defendants and other visitors to avoid paying the 'customary price' charged for the works."
Los Angeles Times v. Free Republic, No. CV 98-7840 MMM, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5669,
at *45, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d 1453, 1459-64 (C.D. Cal. March 31, 2000) (citing Harper & Row, 471
U.S. at 562). Similarly, in Marobie-FL, Inc. v. Nat '1. Assoc. of Fire Equipment Distributors,
the court found a commercial use where the non-profit organization that placed copyrighted
clip art on its website without paying the copyright owners, since the organization used the site
"for the commercial purposes of promoting the association (whose members pay dues) and
generating advertising revenue." Marobie-FL, Inc. v. Nat'l. Assoc. of Fire Equip. Distributors,
983 F. Supp. 1167 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
161 However, it should be noted that the court in Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp. held that the
use of the plaintiffs images was "not highly exploitative" and found that "the commercial
nature of the use weighs only slightly against a finding of fair use." Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp.,
336 F.3d 811, 815 (9th Cir. 2003).
162 The court held that the defendant was not liable for borrowing 4.3 percent of words
from a copyrighted interview with a woman, published in a book of interviews of women
discussing their post-abortion experiences. The court expressly refused to "make a clear-cut
choice between two polar characterizations, 'commercial' and 'non-profit' because "(w)ere
that the case, fair use would be virtually obliterated, for all publications presumably are
operated for profit." Martone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1262 (2d Cir. 1986)
(quoting Koussevitzky v. Allen, Towne & Health, Inc., 68 N.Y.S.2d 779 (1947)). See also Sega
Enter. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1522 (9th Cir. 1992). See generally supra note 137
and accompanying text.
Fall 2005] BUFFALO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LA WJOURNAL 75
the court in Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp.-one of the few cases that
directly address the issue of fair use for web-posted images-adopted
the language of the court in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music and focused
on "whether and to what extent the new work is transformative," which
the Campbell court defined as "whether the new work merely
supersede[s] the objects of the original creation, or instead adds some-
thing new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the
first with new expression, meaning, or message.' 1 63 In Kelly, the
defendant made use of the plaintiff's copyrighted images in a commer-
cial search engine for images that displayed results in the form of
thumbnail images, which included the plaintiff's images.64 The trans-
formative nature of the defendant's use, which added "a further pur-
pose or different character" rather than merely "supersed[ing] the
object of the originals," resulted in a finding of fair use for the thumb-
nail image copies, even though there was "no dispute that Arriba
operates its web site for commercial purposes and that Kelly's images
were part of Arriba's search engine database." The Kelly court found
that the defendant's "much smaller, lower-resolution images ... served
an entirely different function than Kelly's original images," which
were "artistic works intended to inform and engage the viewer in an
aesthetic experience," rather than as functional components of a "tool
to help index and improve access to images on the Internet and their
related web sites."' 165
However, courts must, in the process of analyzing whether a
work is truly transformative, also consider the third fair use element-
the amount and substantiality of the portion of the original work
copied. 166 The third fair use element limits the first fair use element by
163 Kelly, 336 F.3d at 818 (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 579
(1994)).
164 Id. at 815.
165 The deterioration of image quality due to image compression made the thumbnail
images unusable for artistic or aesthetic purposes, so that "users are unlikely to enlarge the
thumbnails and use them for artistic purposes." Note, however, that the issue of whether fair
use covered the defendant's use of a full-sized, high-quality image on an image attributes page
was remanded. Id. at 818. See also supra note 152 for a discussion of compression and
thumbnail images.
166 17 U.S.C. § 107(1), (3) (2002). See also Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60
F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994) ("Specifically, by focusing on the amount and substantiality of the
original work used by the secondary user, we gain insight into the purpose and character of the
use as we consider whether the quantity of the material used was reasonable in relation to the
purpose of the copying.") (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 586 (1994)).
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lessening the likelihood of fair use protection "when an original work
is merely retransmitted in a different medium" in entirety, "leav[ing]
the character of the original broadcasts unchanged."' 167 Courts have
held that exact copying was not transformative when it consisted of the
rebroadcast of a radio program over telephone lines or the reproduction
of news footage without editing the content, explaining the footage, or
including editorial content. 168 More recently, courts have alsoapplied
the same principles to online content and, borrowing the language of
the Campbell case, dismissed uses such as the verbatim posting of news
articles and the copying of free shareware because they "reveal a dearth
of transformative character or purpose under the first factor."'1 69 In Los
Angeles Times v. Free Republic, the court held that there was "little
transformative" character or purpose in posting "exact copies of whole
or substantial portions of articles" on a non-profit, news discussion
forum, in spite of the comments and criticism added by users to
accompany the articles. The Los Angeles Times court reasoned that
"[c]ommentary on news events requires only recitation of the underly-
ing facts, not verbatim repetition of another's creative expression of
those facts in a news article," which is "more than is necessary to
further the defendants' critical purpose.' 170 Despite a slew of music
file-sharing cases, no published cases have yet addressed the fair use
defense in the context of copying files intentionally posted online by
the copyright holder, but both the A & MRecords v. Napster, Inc. and
UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Mp3.com, Inc. courts held that the exchange
of MP3 files created from audio CDs "simply repackage[d] those
recordings to facilitate their transmission through another med-
167 See Infinity Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104, 108 (2d Cir. 1998) (finding that
the retransmission of radio broadcast over telephone lines was not transformative). See UMG
Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding that
reproduction of audio CD into computer MP3 format did not transform the work). See also Los
Angeles News Serv. v. Reuters Television Int'l. Ltd., 149 F.3d 987, 993 (9th Cir. 1998)
(finding that the reproduction of news footage without editing the footage "was not very
transformative").
168 Kelly, 336 F.3d at 815, 819, n. 19 (citing the cases discussed supra note 168).
169 Storm Impact v. Software of the Month Club, 13 F. Supp. 2d 782, 788 (N.D. Ill. 1998)
(holding that the mechanical modification of a software program in order to distribute it, does
not render it a transformative use). See also Los Angeles Times v. Free Republic, No. CV
98-7840 MMM, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5669, at *45, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d 1453, 1459-64 (C.D. Cal.
March 31, 2000) (holding that the full-text copying of copyrighted news articles constituted an
infringing use, even though the articles were posted in conjunction with bulletin board
commentary about the articles).
170 Los Angeles Times, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1468.
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ium," a use that was "innovative... [but] ... not transformative. '171
But even though courts are "reluctant to find fair use when an original
work is merely retransmitted in a different medium," an exact repro-
duction of the original work may nonetheless merit fair use protection
if it is sufficiently transformative. 172 The Kelly court found that the use
of artistic photographs as functional components in a graphics search
engine was sufficiently transformative, even though "Arriba repro-
duced [the plaintiffs] exact images and added nothing to them.
173
Likewise, even though MP3s have received negative treatment in
file-sharing cases, Judge Posner has raised in dicta the possibility of
valid audio downloads under the same space-shifting theory that justi-
fied the use of home VCRs for TV program taping in Sony v.
Universal. 174
Although some cases discuss the third fair use factor in the
analysis of the first and fourth fair use factors, courts must also sepa-
rately consider, as one of the four statutory fair use factors, "the amount
and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted
work as a whole." 175 Quantity is an important variable in the discussion
of digital content, where the nature of digital copying ensures that the
quality of the copied content is always perfect. 176 The boundaries
applied by courts for the third factor of the brick-and-mortar
171 UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(finding that copying and converting an audio CD into MP3 format is not a transformative use
of the work). Cf A & M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). See also
supra note 140 and accompanying text.
172 Kelly, 336 F.3d at 819. Even though the digital images underwent the kind of
mechanical transformation condemned by the court in Storm Impact, the plaintiff in Kelly used
the images for "a different function than Kelly's use - improving access to information on the
Internet versus artistic expression." Storm Impact, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 788. The Kelly court's
view on the transformative nature of the defendant's use was further cemented by the fact that
"it would be unlikely that anyone would use Arriba's thumbnails for illustrative or aesthetic
purpose."
173 Kelly, 336 F.3d at 818-19.
171 Judge Posner discusses in the dicta of In reAimster Copyright Litigation five different
scenarios in which the file sharing service offered by the plaintiff might be legitimate. One of
these scenarios was a time-shifting scenario, comparable to that approved as a fair use in Sony
v. Universal, discussed supra Part II. "Someone might own a popular music CD that he was
particularly fond of, but he had not downloaded it into his computer and now he finds himself
out of town but with his laptop and he wants to listen to the CD, so he uses Aimster's service
to download a copy. This might be a fair use rather than a copyright infringement, by analogy
to the time shifting approved as fair use in the Sony case." Posner also noted, however, that the
analogy had been rejected in UMG Recordings v. MP3.com, Inc. "on the ground that the copy
on the defendant's server was an unauthorized derivative work." In re Aimster Copyright
Litigation, 334 F.3d 643, 652 (7t h Cir. 2003). See also supra note 173.
175 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (2002).
176 Kramarsky, supra note 147, at 5. Kramarsky elaborates on a digital photograph of a
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fair use analysis are also applicable to the discussion of materials
copied from the web. 177 The third factor asks whether "the quantity and
value of the materials used ... are reasonable in relation to the purpose
of the copying," where reproduction of the entire work "does not have
its ordinary effect of militating against a finding of fair use."' 178 Fair use
protection dwindles as the defendant comes closer to "taking the heart
of the original and making it the heart of a new work" or to copying a
substantial portion of the work "verbatim from the copyrighted work,"
and although "wholesale copying does not preclude fair use per se,
copying an entire work militates against a finding of fair use."' 179 In the
analysis of this factor, collections of work are treated as multiple
works, where "each article enjoys independent copyright
protection.' 80 The Kelly court held that the use of thumbnail images
in its search engine constituted fair use because the thumbnail images
"would not be a substitute for the full-sized images because the thumb-
nails lose their clarity when enlarged.,' 181 The Kelly court's stance
sunset as an example of how digital copying operates to produce identical and perfect dupli-
cates of the original. The underlying information is "nothing more than a string of ones and
zeroes" that can be "copied verbatim by a computer equipped with the right software." The
result is that the digital photo could be "email[ed] to you, and you could email it whomever
you liked and so on down the line" - the "twentieth copy of the file would be identical to
mine, and so would the twenty thousandth." See also F. Gregory Lastowka, Free Access and
the Future of Copyright, 27 Rutgers Computer & Tech. L.J. 293, 296-97 (2001) (discussing the
problematic nature of digital copies, since "a digital copy is, at a fundamental level, just a very
long number, a copy of a digital work is the same number" and "superior to copies of the past
insofar as the quality of digital copies does not degrade").
177 See infra note 184 (discussing digital copyright cases dealing with the application of
the amount and substantiality factor).
178 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 587 (1994). In Campbell, the fair use
defense was applicable to the defendant's copying, which consisted of the entirety of the
plaintiff's song melody and a substantial portion of the plaintiff's musical accompaniment. The
court held that it was sometimes reasonable and even necessary for a parodist to copy
substantial portions of the original work, since "[s]ome parodies, by their nature, require
substantial copying." However, the court also noted that not all parodies required substantial
copying to carry out their parodic purpose. The test of the appropriateness of the quantity taken
"is by no means a test of mechanical application." Id. at 598.
179 The Campbell court discussed the parodic nature of the defendant's copying and noted
that, as a general exception to the rule against taking the heart of the work, "the parody must
be able to conjure up at least enough of that original to make the object of its critical wit
recognizable." Id. at 521. See also Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S.
539 (1985); Kelly, 336 F.3d at 820 (quoting Worldwide Church of God v. Philadelphia
Church of God, 227 F.3d 1117, 1118 (9th Cir. 2000)).
180 Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 926 (2d Cir. 1994). See also
generally supra note 141.
'81 Kelly 336 F.3d at 821. See also supra note 147 for a discussion of digital rights
management and note 174 and accompanying text for a discussion of digital image technology.
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on the amount and substantiality factor is an anomaly among the cases
that involve web-posted materials; the factor has generally received
negative treatment in other courts. 82 In comparing the "quantitative
aspect" of a copied collection of digital video clips "in conjunction
with its qualitative value," the court in Video Pipeline v. Buena Vista
Home Entm 't found that the defendant was liable because of the
"plaintiff's reliance on the expressive value of its previews in providing
a description of the copyrighted motion pictures," even though "[f]rom
a merely quantitative standpoint, the use of the small portions of the
films weighs neither in favor of nor against a finding of a fair use
defense."' 183 The published opinions in this area indicate that full-text
copies of copyrighted articles and full-length copies of copyrighted
songs "militat[e] against a finding of fair use".1
8 4
Another factor that carries weight in the discussion of fair use
is the fourth fair use factor, or "the effect of the use upon the potential
market for or value of the copyrighted work."' 85 "Fair use, when
properly applied, is limited to copying by others which does not
materially impair the marketability of the work which is copied," since
a use is not fair "[i]f the defendant's work adversely affects the value
of any of the rights in the copyrighted work" by creating "the potential
for market substitution."' 186 "[E]very commercial use of copyrighted
material is presumptively an unfair exploitation of the monopoly privi-
182 The court approved of the use of thumbnail images in Kelly, but raised doubts about
the legality of the full-sized images that appeared on an image attributes page that appeared in
conjunction with the search results. The Kelly court noted that including a full-resolution image
"does not enhance Arriba's search engine" and in fact consisted of the defendant's "end
product." Id. at 947. Another case that examined wholesale copying was A & MRecords, Inc.
v. Napster, a case where the court held that the wholesale copying of copyrighted songs was
plainly substantial. A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). Likewise,
the court found that full-text copying of news articles was substantial and excessive in relation
to the defendant's asserted purpose of political news discussion. A more qualitative approach
to the evaluation of the amount and substantiality fair use factor was taken by the court in
Micro Star v.Formgen, where user-created computer game levels constituted derivative works
that "impinged on [the plaintiff's] ability to market new versions of the [computer game's]
story," as well as the plaintiff s ability to choose whether or not to enter the market. MicroStar
v. Formgen Inc., 154 F.3d 1107, 1113 (9th Cir. 1998).
183 Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm't, 192 F. Supp. 2d 321, 340 (D.N.J.
2002) (holding that the defendant exceeded its license by including the plaintiff's copyrighted
digital video trailers in the defendant's searchable online database).
184 A & MRecords, Inc. 239 F.3d at 1016.
185 17 U.S.C. § 107 (4) (2002), construed in Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enter.,
471 U.S. 539, 568 (1985).
186 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566-68.
80 THE PROTECTION OF WEB-POSTED M TERIALS [Vol. 3:46
lege that belongs to the owner of the copyright."' 87 But even if the use
is not commercial, a finding of market harm may result from either
actual harm or potential harm, where a use would "adversely affect the
potential market for the copyrighted work" if it "should become
widespread."'' 8 8 The fact that the plaintiff made its software available
on America Online, encouraging users to "[c]opy this game" and
"[g]ive copies to your friends, family, and associates," did not deter the
court in Storm Impact, Inc. v. Software of Month Club from finding
market harm where the defendant copied the software to a CD and
distributed the CD to members of its for-profit Software of the Month
Club. 189 The court reasoned that the defendant's copying "created ill
will among potential customers" and "interfered with [the plaintiffs]
carefully planned method of distributing MacSki and TaskMaker,"
reducing the possibility that customers might pay for the plaintiffs
services.1 90 Similarly, the court in Micro Star v. Formgen, Inc. also
discussed the market implications of a software CD created by the
defendant, which consisted of 300 user-created levels that the defend-
ant had downloaded online by selling the CD. "Micro Star impinged
on [FormGen's] ability to market new versions of the [video game's]
story," a market that "[o]nly FormGen has the right to enter."''9 On the
Internet, where free content is frequently used to draw consumers to
websites, it becomes more important for copyright holders to maintain
their "right to control access" to content. 
92
The second fair use factor, the "nature of the copyrighted
work," is not critical to analysis of fair use, as applied to web-posted
materials. 93 Copyright protection for an original work of authorship
does not "extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of
operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in
which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such
work."'194 The dichotomy between fact and expression means that "[n]o
187 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,451 (1984). See also
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569 (1994); Storm Impact, Inc. v. Software of Month
Club, 13 F. Supp. 2d 782, 789 (N.D. I11. 1998).
188 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 568 (citing Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 451).
189 Storm Impact, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 785.
190 Id.
191 Micro Star v. Formgen, Inc., 154 F.3d 1107, 1113 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting from
Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 237-38 (1990).
192 Los Angeles Times v. Free Republic, No. CV 98-7840 MMM, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
5669, at *45, U.S.P.Q.2d 1453, 1470 (C.D. Cal. March 31, 2000).
193 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2002).
194 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2002).
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author may copyright facts or ideas," since copyright protection is
"limited to those aspects of the work-termed 'expression'-that dis-
play the stamp of the author's originality."'' 95 The scope of protection
under the second fair use factor parallels the scope of protection under
the Copyright Act, in that it "recognizes that some works are closer to
the core of intended copyright protection than others, with the conse-
quence that fair use is more difficult to establish when the former works
are copied."' 196 A copyrighted work merits more copyright protection if
it is creative, and it simply merits less protection if it is informational
or functional. 197 Cases in applying fair use to web-posted works have
not held that the copyright holder's decision to disseminate a copy-
righted work in the online medium either increases or diminishes the
protection that a work would otherwise merit under a brick-and-mortar
fair use analysis. The fact that a work is posted online means that it is
published, and the fact that a work is published "tend[s] to negate the
defense of fair use," since "under common law the property of the
author ... in his intellectual creation [was] absolute until he voluntarily
part[ed] with the same." 198 But this has not deterred courts from
upholding copyright protection for art photographs, computer soft-
ware, news articles, and video games, even though the materials were
posted online and, therefore, published.199
In order to address these arguments for fair use, as well as to
resolve the tension between copyright holders and educational institu-
tions, the 1996 Conference on Fair Use in Education (CONFU) drafted
guidelines for the use of multimedia content in education and discussed
the implications of digital media, in particular digital images, on the
application of the fair use doctrine. 2°° But even the drafters of the
CONFU guidelines failed to reach a consensus "on what should consti-
tute permissible fair use," since the drafting attempts were "co-
'9 Feist Publ'n, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 350 (1991) (quoting from
Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 547).
196 Los Angeles Times, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1453 (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510
U.S. 569, 586 (1994)).
197 Id.
191 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 551 (citing Am.
Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U.S. 284, 299 (1907); 2 Nimmer § 8.23, at 8-273). See also
Kate O'Neill, Against Dicta: A Legal Method for Rescuing Fair Use From the Right of First
Publication, 89 CAL. L. REV. 369 (2001).
199 See infra cases discussed in this section.
200 See PROPOSAL , supra note 152; August Horvath et al., CONFU Report on Digital
Fair Use, 1 J. PROPRIETARY RIGHTS 28 (1997).
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mplicated by the often competing. interests of the copyright owner and
user communities" and "both law and technology in much of its subject
areas . . . [remained] . . . in flux."'20 1 Even nearly a decade after
CONFU, few cases specifically address the fair use doctrine in the
context of materials posted to the Internet by the copyright holder and,
subsequently, copied by an alleged infringing party. Case law in the
area is sparse, in part because the copyright holder seldom has a stake
in bringing actions against small-scale infringers and, in part, because
the detection of infringement can be difficult.20 2 Litigation is an un-
likely and impracticable course of action unless the infringing party
launches a large-scale commercial use of the image, or the copyright
holder commits time and resources to the detection of infringement.
For the time being, copyright holders can allay their concerns-courts
have favored the protection of copyrighted material over the expansion
of the fair use doctrine. Considering the history of the fair use doctrine
and the few cases that have reached litigation on this issue, fair use may
at best lend some credence to a putative copyright infringer's defense,
but even then, it seems unlikely that fair use will topple the protections
of copyright law on the Internet.
201 Id
202 The court in Kelly v. Arriba Soft does not elaborate on how the plaintiff "discovered
that his photographs were part of Arriba's search engine database." Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp.,
280 F.3d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 2002), rev'd in part, 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003). However, the
court in Playboy Enter., Inc. v. Russ Hardenburgh, Inc. provides an interesting insight into how
a company specializing in web content may police the Internet for copyright infringement.
Adult magazine publisher Playboy gave the job of intellectual property enforcement to em-
ployee Anne Steinfeldt, who "conducted key word searches in the files available on the
[defendant's bulletin board, or BBS]" and "claim[ed] to have downloaded approximately 100
GIFs from the BBS which contained reproductions of [Playboy's] photographs." Playboy also
maintained a company photo-librarian Timothy Hawkins, who "examined the files by display-
ing the images on his computer and comparing those images with photographs from Playboy
Magazine." The court noted that a company whose primary line of business was adult
photographs would "understandably concerned that on-line [sic] systems can be used to
transmit copies of its copyrighted photos to people who have not themselves purchased
Playboy Magazine." Playboy Enter., Inc. v. Russ Hardenburgh, Inc., 982 F. Supp. 503, 506
(N.D. Ohio 1997).
